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A Purpose for Every Time?                                        
The Timing and Length of the Work Week and 
Implications for Worker Well-Being  
LONNIE GOLDEN 
 
Would replacing the conventional work week with a four-day option 
benefit economic performance and well-being?  In the framework of 
economics, the question is whether work week reform can make some 
individuals better off without making other individuals worse off in ways that 
do not hamper other goals such as efficiency, economic growth, and equity.  
Social and individual welfare outcomes would depend on whether reforming 
the work week involves shortening the length of the work day versus 
rearranging the timing of work.  The “public good” case for a policy that 
induces shorter hours of work per employee is a logical extension from 
evidence of the adverse effects stemming from excessively long hours of work 
on workers’ stress, work/life balance, and productivity per hour.  A shorter 
work week may improve workers’ well-being if it creates more total 
employment opportunities; allows more free time to be used at employees’ 
discretion and gives them greater control over work; is accompanied by 
partial income replacement under certain states’ “work-sharing” programs; 
and is well targeted toward workers who prefer shorter hours than they are 
currently working.  Given the heterogeneity of work hour preferences by stage 
of life-cycle, the most promising Fair Labor Standards Act reform proposals, 
from an individualistic standpoint, would be those ensuring that employers 
consider individual employee requests for flexibility in the number of hours or 
the times when the employee is required to work per day or per week. 
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A Purpose for Every Time?                                        
The Timing and Length of the Work Week and 
Implications for Worker Well-Being 
LONNIE GOLDEN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Would a four-day work week improve the performance of the 
economy and benefit society any more than the conventional five-day work 
week?  To answer this, this Article addresses the following questions:  
Why is the work week fixed so tightly at five days?; What are the potential 
repercussions of flexibility that would allow a shorter work week versus a 
rearranged work week?; If the work week was shortened either by fewer 
days or shorter work days, what is the potential for more jobs to be created 
or preserved?; What improvements in employee well-being could be 
expected?; and finally, What would currently pending legislative proposals 
that involve regulation of work time do for the well-being of working 
families? 
II.  SHOULD THE WORK WEEK BE REARRANGED? 
The answer depends largely on what criteria we adopt to evaluate the 
status quo versus a policy-induced change.  In the field of economics, any 
market or policy outcome can be evaluated using four criteria: the effects 
on social or individual welfare, economic efficiency, social equity, and 
economic growth.  Of course, the weight attached to each of these is 
entirely subjective and will be the determining factor regarding the 
evaluation of the policy in question.  For the issue at hand, we must 
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distinguish the compressed work week from the shortened work week 
because each criterion may be affected differently.  The shortened work 
week may take two, perhaps quite different, forms: (1) a temporary 
adjustment downward during economic downturns; or (2) a more 
permanent or indefinite change.  The desirability of any policy will hinge 
on whether it improves overall social welfare, not just the well-being of a 
few.  It is common in the field of economics to judge a policy-induced 
reallocation of resources and its associated income as desirable as long as 
those who benefit from the change gain more than the losers lose.  Better 
yet, it would enhance welfare if the induced change is “Pareto-improving,” 
making at least one individual better off without making any other 
individual worse off.  In theory, market forces are presumed to adjust so 
that no one can be made better off without making someone else equally 
worse off.  But in practice, real world impediments such as limited 
knowledge and information, negative externalities, and the relative 
immobility of labor and its relatively lower bargaining power vis-à-vis 
employers, may make it possible to improve social welfare with a carefully 
designed policy intervention.  The welfare case also derives from the 
nonmonetary benefits of shorter or rearranged work time, such as more 
time off and potentially lower stress and fatigue incurred from work. 
The efficiency (static or instrumental, labor used to full potential 
capacity) case for adopting a shorter work week hinges on the extent to 
which it minimizes layoffs and spells of unemployment.  In addition, the 
efficiency case for a rearranged work week in terms of its timing depends 
on the extent that fewer, but longer, work days will help firms minimize 
their costs in the long run, including those associated with running capital, 
such as utility expenses.  Thus, there may be both a macroeconomic and 
microeconomic case for such policies.  Similarly, to the extent that the 
rearranged work week shortens the duration and depth of an economic 
contraction, it contributes to the longer term rate of economic growth 
(long-run labor productivity improvement).  Finally, the equity 
(justice/fairness in the workplace, household, and economy) case for 
shorter hours is built on the presumption that it more evenly distributes the 
potential pain from economic downturns and gains from economic 
expansions. 
The social welfare case for a public policy that induces shorter hours 
of work per employee is at least somewhat a logical extension from the 
economic case for attempting to restrain excessively long hours of work 
scheduled per employee: 
(1)  Excessive work hours are a cause of symptoms of 
“overwork”—a high risk of detrimental effects to mental or 
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physical health.1  The perceived value of sacrificed time may 
be underestimated; both workers and managers discount the 
long-term risk (or benefits) to well-being and/or sustainable 
productivity when contemplating excessive hours.2  At the 
individual level, with short time compensation (“STC”), the 
welfare loss due to income loss may be offset almost entirely 
by the time gained, depending on how such extra time is 
used. 
(2)  Excessive work hours have negative externalities, such 
as public health risks, and crowding out of time that has a 
beneficial social and economic purpose as human and social 
capital development, such as time for parenting, civic 
activity, and studying.3  For example, the leading reason 
students identify that leads them to drop out of college is the 
time pressure, stress, and student performance reduction due 
to having to work (sometimes full-time hours).4 
(3)  There is imperfect functioning in labor markets, with 
overemployment and underemployment existing 
simultaneously in the same industry or occupation, if not 
often in the same enterprise or organization.5  Unfortunately, 
                                                                                                                          
1 See ELLEN GALINSKY ET AL., FAMILIES & WORK INST., OVERWORK IN AMERICA: WHEN THE 
WAY WE WORK BECOMES TOO MUCH, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2005) (finding that workers who 
were overworked were more likely to experience higher levels of stress and more apt to suffer from 
clinical depression and overall poor health); Francis Green, It’s Been a Hard Day’s Night: The 
Concentration and Intensification of Work in Late Twentieth-Century Britain, 39 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 
53, 53–55 (2001) (discussing the effect of longer work hours and work pressure on mental and physical 
health). 
2 See Lonnie Golden, Flexible Daily Work Schedules in U.S. Jobs: Formal Introductions Needed? 
48 INDUS. REL. 27, 29–30 (2009) (noting positive results for both the employer and the employee when 
employees are offered more flexible schedules); Chung-Ping A. Loh, Physical Inactivity and Working 
Hour Inflexibility: Evidence from a U.S. Sample of Older Men, 7 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 257, 258 
(2009) (stating that lack of time due to working hour restrictions is one of the major reasons behind the 
lack of exercise by many individuals); see also generally Edward Shepard & Thomas Clifton, Are 
Longer Hours Reducing Productivity in Manufacturing?, 21 INT’L J. MANPOWER 540 (2000). 
3 See Claire C. Caruso, Possible Broad Impacts of Long Work Hours, 44 INDUS. HEALTH 531, 
533–34 (2006) (summarizing research finding that long work hours may lead to public health concerns 
if fatigued workers make errors, and that long hours may lead to “reduced participation in civic 
organizations, voting, and church attendance”); see also generally THE LONG WORK HOURS CULTURE: 
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND CHOICES (Ronald J. Burke & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2008) (exploring the 
various motives for working long hours and the varied consequences of work hours on individual, 
family, and organizational health); WORK, FAMILY, HEALTH, AND WELL-BEING (Suzanne M. Bianchi 
et al. eds., 2005) (surveying the effects of long work hours and scheduling mismatches on the quality of 
family life, child development, communities, and workplaces). 
4 PUBLIC AGENDA, WITH THEIR WHOLE LIVES AHEAD OF THEM: MYTHS AND REALITIES ABOUT 
WHY SO MANY STUDENTS FAIL TO FINISH COLLEGE 5–7 (2009). 
5 See Patricia E. van Echtelt et al., The New Lumpiness of Work: Explaining the Mismatch 
Between Actual and Preferred Working Hours, 20 WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 493, 502 (2006) (showing 
that overemployment is increasingly the product of “post-Fordist” job design, which combines high 
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such mismatches by preferences do not tend to resolve 
themselves in the labor market over time.6  Rather, workers 
tend to quit their jobs to find a better match regarding hours, 
leading to extensive costs involved with mobility and loss of 
specific human capital for workers and employers.7  When 
preferences regarding the duration of working time are 
disparate in a labor market, the equilibrium will produce too 
few jobs with relatively short hours to match workers’ 
preferences.8 
(4)  There is malfunctioning at the macroeconomic level 
resulting in unemployment (e.g., the current recession), some 
of which could be curbed by institutional innovations that 
forestall or prevent layoffs from occurring in the first place 
(e.g., STC).9 
The establishment of an overtime pay premium in the United States in 
1938 was grounded in the supposition that this would curb the quantity of 
employers’ hours of extra labor demanded per week, per employee.10  The 
                                                                                                                          
production expectations with job autonomy, and is less due to supervisor imposition of longer hours 
than worker-preferred hours). 
6 See, e.g., Dominique Anxo et al., Introduction: Working Time in Industrialized Countries, in 
WORKING TIME AND WORKERS’ PREFERENCES IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES: FINDING THE 
BALANCE, at 1, 5–6 (Jon C. Messenger ed., 2004) (describing the need to obtain more data about 
“workers’ needs and preferences”); Lucie Davoine & Dominique Méda, Work More To Earn More? 
The Mixed Feelings of Europeans, 148 INT’L LAB. REV. 15, 31–34, 42 (2009) (analyzing possible 
factors that may affect an employee’s working hours preferences); Steffen Otterbach, Mismatches 
Between Actual and Preferred Work Time: Empirical Evidence of Hours Constraints in 21 Countries, 
J. CONSUMER POL’Y 1–2 (2009) (discussing various work hours constraints); van Echtelt et al., supra 
note 5, at 494–95 (discussing restrictions on employees in their choice of working hours). 
7 See Kerwin Kofi Charles & Philip Decicca, Hours Flexibility and Retirement, 45 ECON. 
INQUIRY 251, 267 (2007) (stating that hours constraints may force workers to partially or fully retire); 
Sarah Senesky, Testing the Intertemporal Labor Supply Model: Are Jobs Important?, 12 LAB. ECON. 
749, 751–53, 770–71 (2005) (finding that “lifetime utility” considerations fall behind an employee’s 
decision to transition to a new employer to find a better match for his or her preferred number of 
hours). 
8 James B.  Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short-Hour Jobs? 
An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives, 33 ECON. INQUIRY 257, 258 (1995). 
9 See WAYNE VROMAN & VERA BRUSENTSEV, URBAN INST., SHORT-TIME COMPENSATION AS A 
POLICY TO STABILIZE EMPLOYMENT 1 (2009), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/ 
411983_stabilize_employment.pdf (advocating for short-time compensation, in which “labor hours are 
reduced in line with the change in output, but the decrease in hours worked is spread among a larger 
pool of employees than under layoffs,” which may help preserve existing jobs and reduce further 
losses); Michael Huberman & Chris Minns, The Times They Are Not Changin’: Days and Hours of 
Work in Old and New Worlds, 1870–2000, 44 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 538, 563 (2007) (noting 
the difficulty in determining the effect of various institutions, such as tax codes and welfare policies, 
across national workforces). 
10 See MARC LINDER, THE AUTOCRATICALLY FLEXIBLE WORKPLACE: A HISTORY OF OVERTIME 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 134 (2002) (discussing how the FLSA overtime provisions 
developed out of state laws that were passed to restrain the work week and spread employment, 
eventually settling on the use of a financial disincentive over criminal sanction to achieve the intended 
result); see also Stephen J. Trejo, Does the Statutory Overtime Premium Discourage Long 
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social welfare case for the overtime law rests on the assumption that 
additional income, which the regulation denied those workers who were 
already working at least forty hours per week, would create less net 
welfare loss than the welfare gain if the same hours and income went to 
those whose hours were short or zero.  That is, instead of scheduling ten 
hours of overtime per week for four employees, employers would create a 
new job or move two employees from twenty hours per week to forty if 
they preferred a full-time position.  Indeed, those who worked precisely 
forty hours were no more likely to feel underemployed than those working 
fewer than forty hours.  This argument is supported by the fact that 
workers with long hours, even those paid by the hour and likely to qualify 
for premium overtime pay, were more likely to feel “overemployed”—that 
is, a greater willingness than those with fewer hours to forego income in 
order to shorten their hours of work.11  The overtime pay premium in the 
United States apparently is not much of a “binding constraint” that is 
unfairly denying workers the opportunity to work more hours to earn more 
income. 
To establish standards across all United Nations member countries, the 
International Labor Organization developed a subset of policy suggestions 
that promote “decent working time,” as part of its “Decent Work” 
initiative.12  Its five separate, but potentially overlapping, items can be 
categorized as arrangements that would: (1) preserve worker health and 
workplace safety; (2) enhance labor productivity; (3) be “family-friendly”; 
(4) facilitate workers’ choice and influence over their own working hours; 
and (5) promote gender equality.13  These are broad goals, often 
reinforcing but not necessarily compatible (e.g., more productive, but more 
family-friendly). 
III.  IS THERE AN IDEAL WORK WEEK DURATION AND/OR ARRANGEMENT? 
At the individual and household level, there may in fact be an ideal 
work week; however, this is not necessarily the case across all workers at 
the national level, nor even for some individuals as they progress through 
different stages of the life cycle.  Every country in the world has faced this 
question and tackled it somewhat differently.  When the Fair Labor 
                                                                                                                          
Workweeks?, INDUS. LAB. REL. REV., Apr. 2003, at 530 (providing evidence that expanded coverage of 
the overtime pay premium does not actually suppress use of overtime hours in the long run, presumably 
because employers eventually adjust straight time wage rates downward). 
11 Lonnie Golden & Tesfayi Gebreselassie, Overemployment Mismatches: The Preference for 
Fewer Work Hours, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 2007, at 18, 32. 
12 See International Labor Organization, Decent Work for All, http://www.ilo.org/global/About_ 
the_ILO/Mainpillars/WhatisDecentWork/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2010); see also Jean-
Yves Boulin et al., Decent Working Time in Industrialized Countries: Issues, Scopes and Paradoxes, in 
DECENT WORKING TIME: NEW TRENDS, NEW ISSUES, at 13, 13–40 (Jean-Yves Boulin et al. eds., 2006). 
13 See Jon C. Messenger, Towards Decent Working Time, in DECENT WORKING TIME, supra note 
12, at 419, 419–44. 
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Standards Act (“FLSA”) was passed over sixty years ago, most jobs were 
full-time and held by the household’s primary “breadwinner,” making it 
easy to establish a standard schedule that was based on a five-day work 
week with a predictable, regular eight-hour work day and fixed daily start 
and end times.  By 2004, only twenty-three percent of households fit the 
traditional breadwinner/homemaker married couple household model;14 
barely half of the workforce was on a traditional 8:00/9:00 a.m. to 
5:00 p.m. daily schedule, while as many as sixteen percent of the workers 
could not, when asked, specify the typical end time of their work day.15 
In sum, if there is evidence that a four-day work week would heighten 
individual well-being, increase job opportunities, or increase productivity, 
then it is a laudable goal.  Thus, this Article examines whether temporary 
work sharing, a reduction in the standard work week, and/or more control 
over the timing of work hours creates more employment opportunities, 
greater labor productivity per hour, and the potential for gains in worker 
well-being.  While there is not necessarily an “ideal” or “optimal” one-
size-fits-all work week for everybody at every point in time, there may be a 
“goldilocks” work week—one that is not too long, not too short, and that 
satisfies both the employer’s interest in maximizing and improving 
productivity and the employee’s interest in maximizing well-being.  It 
must be recognized that employers have a long-term interest in their 
employees’ well-being, too, to attend to the long-run cost savings involved 
with improved retention and recruiting when their employees experience 
less stress or life satisfaction (i.e., happiness). 
Individuals have a keen interest in time, of which there are at least four 
facets.16  One facet of time is how it is textured, which may be a cultural 
perception (e.g., linear versus cyclical or seasonal).  Most pertinent here is 
the clearly limited quantity of time.  Within a given quantity of time, 
individuals try to coordinate time, to create rhythms, patterns, or 
regularities.  For those employed, particularly those with parenting 
responsibilities, there is an increased perception of a chronic shortage of 
non-work time.17  Another facet of time is intensification or pace.  One 
example is the experience of “speed up,” which may occur in both work 
                                                                                                                          
14 TOM W. SMITH, NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. CHI., CHANGES IN FAMILY 
STRUCTURE, FAMILY VALUES, AND POLITICS, 1972–2006, at 29 tbl.9 (2007), available at 
http://publicdata.norc.org:41000/gss/documents//SCRT/SC53%20Changes%20in%20Family%20Struct
ure,%20Family%20Values,%20and%20Politics,%201972-2006.pdf. 
15 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Workers on Flexible and Shift 
Schedules in May 2004, tbl.7 (July 1, 2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/flex.pdf.  
This figure is about triple the proportion that reported this when it was first measured in 1985.  See 
generally Earl F. Mellor, Shift Work and Flexitime: How Prevalent Are They?, MONTHLY LAB. REV., 
Nov. 1986, at 14. 
16 TODD D. RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE: LAW AND THE BALANCE OF LIFE 2–9 (2002). 
17 JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY, AND GENDER 
INEQUALITY 28–29 (2004). 
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and non-work spheres.  This includes “harried leisure” time for consumers 
who are fortunate enough to enjoy growing affluence but with limited 
time.18  A final facet is the experience of time deepening, such as 
attempting ever more tasks or activities within a given unit of time.19 
In order to more explicitly consider the importance of timing and 
coordination issues regarding working hours, the conventional economic 
model of optimal labor supply must be augmented.  Workers have an 
interest in the timing of work. Increased flexibility—i.e., any 
rearrangement that provides individuals more decisional latitude, 
discretion, or autonomy in scheduling work across a day or week—gained 
in a given job allows workers to better coordinate the timing of their work 
and non-work activities. 
Even mainstream economic models recognize that the “marginal utility 
of income” depends on an individual’s health or injury status, just as it 
does on the health and human capital development of their own children.20  
Thus, having the flexibility to alter the timing of a given number of work 
hours, such as compressing it into four rather than five days, may produce 
a higher level of well-being for a worker who prefers or adapts positively 
to such a rearrangement.21  Thus, the worker’s well-being is higher than if 
his or her job produced the same level of income and non-work, free or 
leisure time—the traditional two items in the standard “utility function” in 
the economic approach.  From the perspective of labor supply, whether 
well-being increases following a policy-induced shorter (or rearranged) 
work week or work day depends on what happens to the components of 
utility—the associated changes in income, leisure time, and ability to 
control the timing of both work and leisure time. 
The above discussion neglects the labor demand perspective and 
focuses solely on labor suppliers.  That is why flexible work arrangements 
are not available to all employees who might benefit from arrangements 
such as compressed work weeks, flexible start and end times, and work-at-
home opportunities.  Shift lengths that are long and/or fixed may serve to 
minimize average labor costs.22  High and/or growing “fixed costs” of 
employment, such as hiring and training costs, insurance costs fixed per 
employee, paid leave times, and payroll tax contributions, create an 
incentive for employers to extend hours of work per employee rather than 
                                                                                                                          
18 STAFFAN BURENSTAM LINDER, THE HARRIED LEISURE CLASS 10–12 (1970). 
19 See LOTTE BAILYN ET AL., SLOAN WORK-FAMILY POLICY NETWORK, INTEGRATING WORK 
AND FAMILY LIFE: A HOLISTIC APPROACH 5–6 (2001), available at http://web.mit.edu/workplace 
center/docs/WorkFamily.pdf. 
20 E.g., Arleen A. Leibowitz, An Economic Perspective on Work, Family, and Well-Being, in  
WORK, FAMILY, HEALTH, AND WELL-BEING, supra note 3, at 187, 188–91. 
21 See Harry J. Holzer, Work and Family Life: The Perspective of Employers, in WORK, FAMILY, 
HEALTH, AND WELL-BEING, supra note 3, at 83, 83 (noting that many individuals and families prefer 
the family-related benefits enabled by flexible work schedules). 
22 See id. at 84–85. 
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hiring new employees during expansion times, and use layoffs rather than 
work-sharing practices during downturns.23  In theory, employers may 
need to implement compensating wage differentials for workers who 
receive flexibility in scheduling, or any family- or worker-friendly 
benefits; however, the evidence is mixed as to whether the labor market 
produces them.  There may be up to a twenty percent wage reduction,24 or 
even a positive association with wages to the extent there are positive 
effects on worker productivity.25 
Compressed work weeks and, to some extent, reduced work week 
options, are both employee benefits (i.e., “job amenities” or perks) that 
reduce “fixed costs of working,” or time-based stresses balancing work and 
family life.26  This potentially enhances workers’ welfare and serves as a 
productivity-enhancing tool for management of human resources.  Thus, 
they involve for employers a comparison of the costs of adopting versus 
the costs of not adopting them.  The optimal level of such work time 
flexibility provided by employers will depend on the cost estimates of 
firms regarding the managerial or administrative implementation or 
transition, monitoring, and potential abuse costs associated with such 
practices.27  It also depends on an employer’s time horizon, since most of 
the costs may occur up front or in the short run, while most of the cost 
savings accrue over the long run (e.g., reductions in turnover, absenteeism, 
tardiness, unauthorized sick time) and any sustainable gains are 
uncertain.28  Indeed, flexible work practices such as compressed or 
temporarily reduced work weeks might boost employee productivity 
indirectly because of their welfare-enhancing effects: these practices allow 
employees to better coordinate their work activity with other activities to 
avoid productivity-impeding time conflicts (e.g., school, daycare, traffic 
congestion, natural circadian rhythms), as well as fostering higher job 
satisfaction among employees in the long run.  Moreover, employers may 
choose not to implement such practices if: (1) they overestimate the true 
costs of the above; (2) they underestimate the true costs savings or the 
potential wage rate reductions they would eventually receive by offering 
                                                                                                                          
23 See id. at 86–87. 
24 John S. Heywood et al., The Implicit Wage Costs of Family Friendly Work Practices, 59 
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 275, 291 (2007). 
25 Kim A. Weeden, Is There a Flexiglass Ceiling? Flexible Work Arrangements and Wages in the 
United States, 34 SOC. SCI. RES. 454, 461 (2005) (identifying popular reasoning that flexible work 
schedules enhance employee productivity and wages). 
26 See id. at 476 (concluding that “employees who do some or all of their work at home are 
neither better nor worse off than their fixed-location counterparts, but employees who work flexible 
schedules enjoy wage premiums relative to their fixed-schedule employees”). 
27 Morris Altman & Lonnie Golden, The Economics of Flexible Work Scheduling: Theoretical 
Advances and Contemporary Paradoxes, in WORKPLACE TEMPORALITIES, at 313, 321–22 (Beth A. 
Rubin ed., 2007). 
28 See id. at 320 (noting the heterogeneous nature of costs and benefits for the employer as 
compared to the employee). 
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flexible work options as a valued non-wage benefit to employees; (3) they 
consider their own “utility” more strongly than that of their employees in 
maintaining the managerial discretion to selectively allocate flexibility; or 
(4) they withhold such benefits when their bargaining leverage is relatively 
greater than their employees’ leverage.  For these reasons, and the 
properties of flexibility as an underprovided but necessary “public good”—
having spillover benefits beyond just the firm and worker, on to the health 
of families, communities, and economic and ecological sustainability—
there is a compelling case to be made that their adoption must be pressed 
by the public sector or government and not just private employers based 
even on long-term self-interest alone.  Indeed, the conditions conducive to 
work week flexibility are ripe for adoption in some occupations more than 
others.  Generally, exempt jobs (often salaried) feature far more work day 
flexibility than nonexempt jobs.29  For example, lawyers and judges are 
more than twice as likely as the average employee to be allowed to change 
their daily start and end times for work.30 
In the latest International Social Survey Programme module on “Work 
Orientations,” those employed were asked to describe how their start and 
finish times of working hours were decided.  In 2005, in the United States, 
almost half of all employees (45%) had no say in the decision, and only 
15% felt they were free to decide their own work schedules.31  The General 
Social Survey in 2006, “Quality of Working Life” module, found that only 
20% of the workforce felt that flexible hours in a job is not an important 
feature.32  Moreover, the survey found that about 47% of men and 37% of 
women who received salaries were able to “often” change their daily work 
schedule.  This is in contrast to only about 20% of both men and women 
who were allowed to do so in hourly paid jobs.  The proportions who were 
“never” allowed to change their schedules were about 40% for salaried 
workers and 24% for the hourly paid workforce.33  Thus, the ability of 
workers to influence the timing of their work in their daily schedules is 
currently a glass at least half empty, and far more than half for the hourly, 
relatively lower paid workforce. 
Is there an optimal level of hours per week?  Some analysts have found 
that there is a strong and quite homogeneous preference among men for a 
standard full-time work week.  Among women, however, the preference is 
quite heterogeneous.  It varies considerably by age (i.e., life-cycle stage) 
                                                                                                                          
29 See Golden, supra note 2, at 45. 
30 Id. at app. 53–54. 
31 INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SURVEY PROGRAMME, WORK ORIENTATIONS III (2005).  Data on file 
with author. 
32 GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY, MODULE ON QUALITY OF WORKING LIFE (2006).  Data on file with 
author. 
33 Id. 
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and their share of household work.34  Among households with dual earners 
in salaried positions, there is a strong convergence toward sixty hours of 
work among intact households with children.  When both parents work up 
to but, do not exceed, sixty hours per week combined, these sixty-hour 
couples report improved well-being and less work/family conflict.35  In 
Australia, women in dual-earner households prefer to work just under 
three-quarters as long as their partner works—twenty-eight and forty 
hours, respectively, in the average household.36  This is not too dissimilar 
from the “one and a half jobs” per household model attributed to the 
typical labor force participation of households in the Netherlands.37 
IV.  THE CASE OF WORK-SHARING 
Work-sharing is considered to be any type of policy-induced, 
downward adjustment of working time.  Shortened work weeks might be 
intended to be permanent or temporary arrangements.  The former have 
been popular with certain European governments and labor unions, either 
as a reward in the form of leisure time for productivity gains achieved or as 
a potential means for spreading employment opportunities, particularly to 
those who have faced difficulty finding employment.38  A key goal of both 
arrangements is a higher employment level—the first, by counteracting the 
structural issues, and the second, by combatting the cyclical forces that 
restrain job creation or encourage job destruction and job security among 
the employed.  The temporary types of work-sharing may be promoted 
through government programs designed for the purpose of preventing or 
postponing planned layoffs by employers, thus preserving employment, 
typically during recessions.  The STC program in the unemployment 
insurance system tends to benefit employers in the long run by saving them 
burdensome training and hiring expenses when a downturn eventually 
ends.  In North America, Canada and seventeen U.S. states have adopted 
                                                                                                                          
34 See E. Jeffrey Hill et al., Researching the 60-Hour Dual-Earner Workweek: An Alternative to 
the “Opt-Out Revolution,” 49 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1184, 1185–86 (2006) (observing that many 
women choose to work part-time or leave their careers entirely once they become mothers). 
35 Id. at 1193. 
36  See Brigid van Wanrooy, A Desire for 9 to 5: Australians’ Preference for a Standard Working 
Week, 17 LAB. & INDUSTRY 71, 85 (2007).  Generally, men prefer to work about ten more hours per 
week than women.  See Jeremy Reynolds & Lydia Aletraris, Pursuing Preferences: The Creation and 
Resolution of Work Hour Mismatches, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 618, 626 (2006).   
37 See Jelle Visser, The First Part-Time Economy in the World: A Model To Be Followed?, 12 J. 
EUR. SOC. POL’Y 23, 24–26 (2002); see also generally Janneke Plantenga, Combining Work and Care 
in the Polder Model: An Assessment of the Dutch Part-Time Strategy, 22 CRITICAL SOC. POL’Y 53 
(2002). 
38 See William K. Roche et al., Working Time and Employment: A Review of International 
Evidence, 135 INT’L LAB. REV. 129, 130–31 (1996) (describing the renewed interest in work-sharing in 
Europe as reflected in the mandatory adoption of a Working Time Directive by the European Union, 
which seeks to redistribute the total volume of work in order to increase employment opportunities for 
those seeking work). 
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STC as part of their unemployment insurance programs.  They vary in size 
and number of participating workers; number of participating companies; 
amounts of wage subsidies and/or tax incentives offered to promote work-
sharing; links between work-sharing and training/retraining activities for 
affected workers; specific time limits on the availability of work-sharing 
measures; and the total financial outlays associated with the work-sharing 
program.  In the STC program, employers must choose to register with the 
unemployment insurance system and announce a potential reduction in 
workforce in an affected work unit.  Employees can enjoy replacement of 
lost earnings, typically based on half of the overall percentage of reduced 
hours within the work unit, for up to twenty-six weeks while the reduction 
is still in force.39 
The main value of STC might be more as a “defensive measure,” 
preventing layoffs that would lead to a long spell of unemployment for a 
worker.  The potentially positive effects of STC are for the macroeconomy, 
employers, and workers—unemployed and employed alike.  It also may act 
as an automatic stabilizer to keep consumption spending from going into a 
free fall.  Under certain circumstances,  work-sharing may promote the 
creation of new jobs and thus promote a stronger or more hastened 
recovery.  Perhaps most importantly, and most often neglected, the 
reduction in daily hours or number of days at work per week grants those 
who remain employed additional time off—time that they can devote to 
other uses ordinarily not attended to. 
Is the ideal work week shorter than the current standard?  When it 
comes to permanent reductions in work weeks, there are many possible 
filters—with both direct and indirect effects—which exist between 
transforming a reduction in standard hours into eventual employment 
creation effects.  The potentially positive direct effect is that employers 
will be compelled to create more jobs to recoup potential drops in output.  
This occurs to the extent that hours and employment are substitutable in 
total labor input.  Employment effects at the macroeconomic level occur 
only if aggregate demand (i.e., total spending) is not reduced, but rather 
shifted in composition.  This depends on adding more employees who are 
subject to “diminishing returns” and daily “set-up costs” for employers 
being relatively low.  This would mitigate the potentially negative effects 
on employment if overall output was reduced.  To minimize direct negative 
effects on output due to restricting work hours, evidence suggests that 
shortening work days is superior to reducing the number of days, given the 
fixed costs of work for employers.40 
                                                                                                                          
39 See VROMAN & BRUSENTSEV, supra note 9, at 1–3, 8, 17. 
40 DANIEL S. HAMERMESH, WORKDAYS, WORKHOURS AND WORK SCHEDULES: EVIDENCE FOR 
THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 141 (1996). 
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There are several indirect effects that act as potential “offsets” to the 
translation of reduced hours into more jobs.41  The clearest offset is the rise 
in per-unit labor costs that employers will incur if per-hour pay is not 
reduced proportionately, which creates adverse “scale effects” at the 
individual firm level.  The consequent rise in average costs of production, 
if it cannot be passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices, 
would reduce the total demand for labor, hours, and employees.42  If the 
rise in costs is passed along to consumers, then it would ultimately reduce 
demand for output, and thus firms would need fewer employees.  
Similarly, if the firm’s capital capacity becomes more underutilized, its 
costs would escalate.  Moreover, as the ratio of fixed costs of labor per 
hour worked rises, this incentivizes longer scheduled hours and “labor 
hoarding” rather than new job creation.  Even with standard hours reduced, 
firms might rationally choose to keep the duration of hours steady.  This is 
the “overtime leakage effect,” because some of the hours of work per 
employee now become “overtime” hours.  If these hours are paid, 
particularly at premium overtime pay rates, this in turn might also increase 
unit labor costs.  Alternatively, if the additional hours are not paid for, they 
would result in a larger workload for salaried workers.43 
Another factor is referred to as the “productivity offset.”  Firms may 
respond to an externally-imposed reduction in the standard work week by 
rearranging or reorganizing work hours, perhaps across the year (e.g., 
“annualization”) or quickening the expected pace of workers (i.e., 
increasing the average intensity of an hour of work).  Also, some workers 
previously working long hours may have suffered from fatigue at the end 
of their daily shifts or work week.  These responses tend to foster a higher 
rate of worker productivity per hour, which can circumvent the need to hire 
more employees to recoup lost output.  The most stubborn limit on how 
much employment will gain—in other words, how much unemployment 
can be reduced—is the extent to which there is a mismatch or difference in 
the skills between the unemployed and the employed.44  Indeed, reducing 
hours can actually backfire to the extent skilled and unskilled jobs are 
complementary and a work week reduction leads to less use of both 
physical and human capital.45  If most of the unemployed are unskilled, 
and skilled and unskilled labor are complements, then a reduction in work 
                                                                                                                          
41 See Jennifer Hunt, Hours Reductions as Work-Sharing, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY 339, 340–41. 
42 Id. at 340. 
43 See id. at 353; Roche et al., supra note 38, at 140. 
44 Richard B. Freeman, Work-Sharing to Full Employment: Serious Option or Populist Fallacy?, 
in GENERATING JOBS: HOW TO INCREASE DEMAND FOR LESS-SKILLED WORKERS, at 195, 215–16 
(Richard B. Freeman & Peter Gottschalk eds., 1998). 
45 Id. at 216. 
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time of skilled labor actually decreases the demand for the unskilled 
unemployed. 
In sum, the size of the subsequent employment effects of reduced work 
hours are likely to be positive, but may be substantially suppressed if they 
are followed by a  rise in the level of per unit (average) labor cost per hour 
or a rise in the ratio of fixed relative to variable labor costs.  The amount of 
employment created also may be limited by any subsequent increase in 
overtime hours (beyond the reduced standard work week) used by 
employers; a rise in average labor productivity per hour; a reduced rate of 
capital capacity utilization; or an inadequacy of qualified labor available 
for the new positions created.  The overall net effect on employment 
depends on the extent to which the potential direct effect of increasing 
employment, to make up for the hours reduction, is offset by these several 
potential indirect effects that obviate the need for new hiring. 
This, however, may not be the end of the story.  Work-sharing and 
other forms of hours reduction should not be judged to be of limited value 
because they trigger a boost in average labor or organizational 
productivity.  While a standard hours reduction may dampen productivity 
per worker, if it indeed leads to higher average productivity per hour of 
work, this would actually reduce, not increase, per unit labor cost.46  The 
potential gain in the rate of labor productivity per hour makes labor a 
relatively more attractive resource for employers to retain or hire in the 
long run and help counter a rise in costs.  This enhances rather than stifles 
the perhaps small or negligible immediate job creation effects.  In addition, 
productivity offsets may exist only in the short run and evaporate over the 
long term.  Furthermore, the productivity offset may not be symmetric at 
every level of hours.  It tends to be smaller if average hours worked are 
already under forty.  If unit labor cost increases can be avoided, for 
example, via rationalization or intensification of work or increased capital 
capacity utilization, a reduction in hours may actually somewhat promote 
the goal of greater efficiency, welfare, and, quite likely, equity, all without 
harming economic growth.47  Unit labor cost increases can also be avoided 
in cases where the reduced hours are accompanied by fixed hourly wage 
rates, such as in the case of state-sponsored work-sharing measures and/or 
by reinforcing government subsidies for hiring, such as reduced payroll 
taxes (as undertaken in France).48  To reduce the potentially adverse effect 
on labor cost of higher overtime hours, changing the underlying economics 
of the employers’ hours decision—for example, reducing the ratio of fixed 
                                                                                                                          
46 Gerhard Bosch & Steffen Lehndorff, Working-Time Reduction and Employment: Experiences 
in Europe and Economic Policy Recommendations, 25 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 209, 212 (2001).  
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 235, 238; Anders Hayden, France’s 35-Hour Week: Attack on Business? Win-Win 
Reform? Or Betrayal of Disadvantaged Workers?, 34 POL. & SOC’Y 503, 508 (2006). 
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to variable costs of labor by pro-rating the costs of employee benefits—
might induce a replacement of jobs for hours of existing employees.  In the 
specific case of a work week compressed down to four days, states such as 
Utah have experienced a surprising, but fiscally welcome, reduction of 
paid overtime hours, saving the state millions of dollars.49 
Potentially adverse effects on employment also can be avoided if 
shortening shift lengths induces some employers to add new shifts and the 
unemployed are trained in the skills needed to get hired by firms whose 
hours per worker have been shortened.50  In the long term, there is not a 
complete immobility between skill levels and occupations.  Mobility or 
upgrading may indeed occur in actuality at the workplace level, under 
certain conditions, particularly during an eventual period of 
macroeconomic upswing.  Collectively bargained programs have had more 
success in inducing employment gains than those adopted as a national 
policy.51  The actual effects of work-sharing on employment are difficult to 
ascertain empirically because some of the effects occur through job 
retention rather than job creation.52  Indeed, job maintenance may be the 
predominant and most valuable contribution of work-sharing. 
While it may not profoundly reduce unemployment, the social and 
economic benefits of a reduction in work hours may occur through other 
channels, benefiting individuals and the macroeconomy.  For example, 
work-sharing, even when compulsory, grants workers time off from work 
that they likely did not have before, and which they might well value.  A 
survey conducted among 1500 employees facing compulsory 5% 
reductions in work hours and earnings presents illuminating results.53  On 
average, the workers spent 45% of their new non-work time on leisure 
activities such as resting, reading, and hobbies, and 43% of their time on 
other work such as housework, childcare, and nonmarket chores. The 
amount of time spent on other work rose with the presence of children, 
especially for women.  About 12% of their newly free time was spent on 
uncompensated work for the company, which was positively correlated to 
income, education level, and younger ages.  The employee reaction to the 
program was favorable, but far more so for married women than married 
men.  Workers who spent more of their free time working without pay at 
the company, or in home production, were much less positive about the 
program than those who spent more time on leisure activities.  The 
                                                                                                                          
49 Jennifer Senior, The Four-Day Workweek; Getting Over Overtime, N.Y. MAG., Nov. 9, 2009. 
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51 Id. at 220. 
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findings are consistent with recent evidence that men who do not work 
spend more time than their employed counterparts on leisure activities 
(e.g., watching television), but also spend somewhat more time sleeping 
and doing household production work.54  The findings are also consistent 
with the changes in leisure time found in France following the reduction in 
the standard work week from thirty-nine to thirty-five hours.55  The 
individual welfare change attributed to hours reductions such as work-
sharing depends on the degree of income lost versus uses of time gained.  
Those workers whose perceived aversion to loss of income is lower than 
their aversion to loss of time—and whose perceived probability of being 
laid off is high—may wind up with an increase in well-being.  For others, 
however, who do not meet this criterion, their well-being may decrease.  
The net welfare gain might be greatest if the hours reductions were 
targeted toward mismatches in the labor market, specifically toward 
overemployment, which occurs when individuals express a willingness to 
incur reduced income in order to attain shorter working hours.  Some 
regard overemployment as a more potentially damaging mismatch to 
employers and the economy than underemployment (i.e., working fewer 
than one’s preferred number of hours and earning less income).  
Overemployment can be mitigated only through tardiness and absenteeism, 
while underemployment can be mitigated through secondary job holding or 
unpaid work during the unpreferred non-work time.  Those who would 
prefer a reduction in hours tend to be workers with the longest hours. 
According to an analysis of U.S. Current Population Survey data from 
2001 (the last time a relevant question was asked), the overemployment 
rate in the workforce was 5.6% among those working precisely 40 hours, 
but 8.1% among those reporting 41 to 48 hours, 9.6% among those 
working 49 to 59 hours, and 13.3% among those working 60 hours or 
more.  Overemployment is also almost double among workers who usually 
work full-time rather than part-time.  Also, women are almost twice as 
likely to feel overemployed than men: 8.6% versus 5.4%, respectively.56  
This reinforces the results of a recent poll finding that between 1997 and 
2007, working mothers preferred converging toward part-time work at the 
expense of both full-time work and not working.57  However, those 
working the standard forty-hour work week have, on average, the least 
influence over their own schedule, but long-hours and short-hours workers 
                                                                                                                          
54 Jay Stewart, The Time Use of Nonworking Men, in HOW DO WE SPEND OUR TIME? EVIDENCE 
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appear to have more scheduling flexibility.58  Thus, the opportunity for a 
compressed work week might be welcomed most by those who work 
standard forty-hour work weeks, which comprises a full half of the overall 
workforce.  Through an analysis of the 2006 U.S. General Social Survey, 
we can identify some of the specific (i.e., self-reported) well-being 
outcomes for workers who have some control over the timing of their work 
activity—having the flexibility to set or influence their own work 
schedules.59  The two specific indicators examined here are work stress and 
happiness among the employed. 
Working longer hours, working extra hours at least one day per month, 
and working a full-time job all increase work stress.  Thus, even 
controlling for the difference between full-time and part-time employment, 
longer work hours are associated with higher stress.  In contrast, the ability 
to take time off during the day and the ability to set or change start and end 
times of work are associated with significantly lower levels of work stress.  
Working longer hours, however, does not impinge on levels of self-
reported happiness.  In fact, working extra days is somewhat associated 
with higher happiness, although this might reflect simultaneity, such as 
happier workers being more willing and able to put in extra work.  
Nevertheless, when workers have this flexibility, it significantly raises 
their happiness. 
V.  CONCLUSION:  POLICY OPTIONS—COMPENSATORY TIME FOR 
OVERTIME, LEGAL RIGHTS TO REQUEST AND REFUSE 
Laws and regulations can increase the chances of improving social 
welfare and individual welfare outcomes by reforming the work week in 
ways that do not hamper other economic goals such as efficiency, growth, 
and equity.  Can we promote “Pareto-improving” reallocations of work 
time such that at least one individual is made better off without making any 
other individual worse off?  The most promising approach from this more 
individualistic standpoint would be adopting proposed legislation that 
would ensure employers consider individual employee requests for flexible 
work and conditions within two weeks of such a request.60  This legislation 
would specifically authorize an employee to request from an employer a 
change in the terms or conditions of the employee’s employment if the 
request relates to: (1) the number of hours the employee is required to 
work; (2) the times when the employee is required to work, including 
compressed work weeks; or (3) where the employee is required to work.  It 
would be unlawful for an employer to interfere with any rights provided to 
                                                                                                                          
58 Golden, supra note 2, at 34. 
59 See GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY, supra note 32. 
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an employee under this type of legislation.  Employers can deny such 
requests only if the identifiable costs of the change in terms requested in 
the application—such as loss of productivity, costs of retraining or hiring 
employees, or costs of transferring employees from one facility to another 
facility—exceed the overall financial resources involved.61   
The proposed law is quite similar to one adopted already in the United 
Kingdom, as a “right to request” under the Flexible Working regulations, 
which enables mothers and fathers and carers of adults to request shorter 
hours (for an indefinite time period).62   Reforms now under consideration 
would extend the scope of flexible working laws to parents with children 
up to the age of eighteen rather than the current age of sixteen (raised from 
age six in 2007) and would make such rights to request available to all 
workers, regardless of parental status.63  Future discussion might include 
making one’s arrangement portable to their next full-time job.  Likewise, 
the recently adopted Australian “National Employment Standards” include 
a similar legal right to request a flexible schedule, reduced hours, an 
extension of unpaid time off, and part-time work when returning from 
parental leave.64  It also sets the new work week norm at thirty-eight hours, 
to be used for calculating “overtime” and determining how much of that 
time is considered “reasonable” (or “unreasonable”).65  By 2009, fifteen 
U.S. states had passed laws that place restrictions on the use of mandatory 
overtime beyond the usual work week, with a protected right to refuse such 
additional hours.  Virtually all such laws, however, are limited to nurses 
and other healthcare workers.66  Moreover, federal laws have been 
proposed, such as the Safe Nursing and Patient Care Act of 2007,67 which 
languished in the House Subcommittee on Health.  All such laws are 
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consistent with the “Work & Family Bill of Rights,” which advocated a 
right to negotiated flexibility over hours, the ability to shift between full-
time and reduced hours as family and personal circumstances change, no 
mandatory overtime, and flexible schedules mutually agreed upon by 
employees and employers.68 
Proposals in the previous, Republican-controlled Congresses attempted 
to alter the FLSA rules regarding the payment of overtime wages at a 
premium, which would have allowed employers to pay future 
compensatory time off (“comp time”) in lieu of pay, if employees signed 
such an agreement.69  While compelling in that it provided workers much 
needed time off, such a law was bound to be counterproductive as an 
attempt to reduce working hours and/or improve worker well-being.  From 
the perspective of labor demand, there is good reason to believe that 
employers would demand more overtime hours, ironically, from those 
employees who signed a preference for shorter work time.  The legislation 
would make scheduling longer work weeks relatively cheaper because it 
allows employers to store comp time credits for up to a year and have the 
final say in when overtime work gets scheduled and when comp time use 
could be denied.  Comp time could potentially be forcibly scheduled by 
employers according to their own preference rather than that of employees.  
If the law were to foster true worker “choice” by allowing for refusal of the 
originally scheduled overtime hours and allowing workers to decide the 
use of their comp time unless it would clearly “cause substantial and 
grievous injury to the employer’s operations” (rather than the proposed 
lower standard of “avoidance of ‘undue disruption’ of business or 
operations”), it might actually deliver some reduction in overemployment 
among certain workers. 
In a large survey, workers—mostly unionized workers—were asked 
the following question:  “If you had a choice, would you rather be paid 
time-and-a-half for overtime hours or get time-and-a-half OFF for the 
overtime hours you work?”70  Nearly 80% of those surveyed preferred pay 
compensation.  As many as 32% of salaried workers, however, reported 
that would take the comp time option (including those who would consider 
taking either comp time or pay), and women preferred comp time (25%) 
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somewhat more than men.  Those who had fewer vacation days were 
slightly more receptive to having comp time, suggesting again that reduced 
hours appeals more to workers whose non-work time is scarce.  Among 
those who are not paid for their extra hours, 31% would prefer time off.71  
Thus, a system of comp time would be more likely to improve worker 
well-being if it were available to exempt employees, as opposed to the 
non-exempt employees currently governed by the FLSA overtime pay 
regulations.72  This underscores the notion that the well-being effects of 
work week changes will depend on the extent that they are delivered to 
those who actually prefer them, and whether the additional uses of time are 
either welfare- or efficiency-enhancing.  In addition, the timing of work 
and employee control over such work may matter as much as, if not more 
than, the duration of work hours. Thus, reforms that would reduce work 
time must consider nuances in differences among workers by job type and 
income level.73  Reforms should target those types of jobs and workers 
most likely to be overemployed and to have a lack of control over the 
timing of their work; create or preserve employment opportunities; and be 
subsidized through programs such as STC, in order to avoid unintended 
reductions in worker well-being. 
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